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I. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Do the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Article I, Section 2(b) of the California Constitution 
prohibit imposing liability on a vendor whose software enables 
the delivery of drug information for consumers (medication 
summaries known as monographs which are not FDA regulated 
or required) based on a negligence standard, where that 
information is not authored by the vendor, and is derived from 
government records and true? 
2. Does a vendor whose software enables the delivery 
of the monographs that pharmacies may choose to provide to 
patients have a duty to require that pharmacies distribute only 
eight-section monographs, where (a) the pharmacy demands 
that the vendor make available for its use a five-section 
monograph that expressly states it is only a summary; (b) the 
FDA requires the pharmacy to give patients a Medication 
Guide, the wording of which is FDA regulated, which includes 
complete warnings about the alleged risks of the medication; 
I 
and (c) the five-section monograph refers to and directs patients 
to read the Medication Guide, which it is meant to supplement, 
not supplant? 
3. Can a software vendor be held strictly liable on a 
products liability theory for injuries allegedly sustained by a 
third party based on truthful information delivered using its 
software? 
4. Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, bar state-law claims against a software 
vendor premised upon use ofthe vendor's software to deliver a 
non-FDA required or regulated monograph authored by a third 
party? 
II. 
WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED 
For decades, courts across the country have rejected 
lawsuits seeking to hold publishers of consumer products 
information responsible for the safety of the products discussed. 
Those courts correctly have held that the First Amendment does 
not permit liability on a failure-to-warn theory for truthful 
2 
information provided to consumers, barring a promise about the 
product's quality or safety. Thus, the publisher of a book about 
mushrooms is not liable if the book fails to warn about 
particular mushrooms. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 
1033 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Winter"). In contrast, if a publisher 
guarantees a product's quality, it may be liable for harm caused 
by the product. Hanberry v. Hearst Com., 276 Cal.App.2d 680 
(1969). See Section IV.A, infra. 
Limiting liability to the situations where a definite 
undertaking is made is necessary to ensure that First 
Amendment rights are not trampled by turning those who 
publish and distribute speech on matters of significant public 
interest into guarantors of a product's safety, regardless of their 
intent. The potentially endless liability they would face if they 
could be held liable to anyone who claims they were harmed by 
a publication's contents inevitably would chill speech. 
These settled principles should have guided the Court of 
Appeal in this matter. Yet, the Court's published decision 
3 
makes those involved in distributing truthful information 
potentially liable for negligence claims brought by plaintiffs 
who allege the information is incomplete- even where, as here, 
the publication expressly states it is incomplete and refers 
readers to a document with more complete information, that 
was required to be distributed with the publication (including 
the particular information alleged to have been omitted). Worse 
still, the Court refused to strike Plaintiffs' products liability 
claim- although Plaintiffs recognized the claim was 
indefensible and abandoned it on appeal- subjecting software 
vendors to liability without fault for truthful information 
distributed using their software. The Court of Appeal's 
decision is unprecedented; indeed, consistent with settled First 
Amendment principles, PDX is aware of no appellate court in 
the nation that has upheld such liability against a software 
vendor. 
PDX, Inc. and National Health Information Network 
(collectively "PDX") provide software that allows phannacies 
4 
to print medication summaries known as monographs that 
pharmacists may choose to provide when patients receive 
medication. The monographs are authored and regularly 
updated by a third party, Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. 
("WKH"). The Court of Appeal mistakenly asserted that these 
monographs are legally required- they decidedly are not. 
Monographs are designed to supplement- not supplant- a 
pharmacist's legally-mandated obligation to provide patient-
specific counseling, and for certain medications, give patients 
an FDA-approved Medication Guide written by the drug's 
manufacturer. Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin alleges she suffered 
severe injuries after her pharmacist at Safeway, Inc., 
purportedly gave her only the monograph (that directs readers 
to the Medication Guide), and not the FDA-required 
Medication Guide (which contained the warnings she alleges 
would have prevented her injury). 
In a short paragraph, the Court dispatched PDX's First 
Amendment argument, believing PDX failed to establish that 
5 
the monograph was true. Op. 13. This reverses the burden of 
proof; plaintiffs bear the burden of proving falsity in cases 
implicating First Amendment rights. Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Nizam-Aldine v. City of 
Oakland, 47 Cal.App.4th 364 (1996). It also ignores the 
fundamental First Amendment interests at stake here. 
The Court of Appeal's published decision held that PDX 
may be liable under a gratuitous undertaking or "good 
Samaritan" theory- that because Safeway used PDX's software 
to distribute truthful information about the medicine Plaintiff 
was prescribed, PDX could be liable if the monograph did not 
warn her about all of the medicine's alleged risks. But PDX is, 
at most, a mere link in the distribution chain -not a publisher -
of consumer product information. C.T. 38. As this Court 
recognized in Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 48-49 (2006), 
"the responsibility of publishers for offensive content is greater 
than that of mere distributors." Thus, PDX's liability is more 
remote than in the publisher or author context, where courts 
6 
consistently reject liability. Review is necessary to make clear 
that the First Amendment does not permit liability against those 
involved in distributing truthful speech regarding matters of 
public interest on the thin reed of negligence. Section IV, infra. 
The Court also should grant review because the Court of 
Appeal fundamentally misconstrued - and dramatically 
expanded - the gratuitous undertaking or "good Samaritan" 
theory. As this Court made clear, liability under this theory is 
limited by the scope of the undertaking; thus a good Samaritan 
is not liable for failing to do something it did not undertake to 
do. Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 18 Cal.4th 604,617-618 (1998) 
("Artiglio"). During the time relevant to this litigation, PDX 
never undertook to enable distribution of a drug summary 
containing all FDA-required medication information and 
warnings. Under its agreement with Safeway- which defined 
PDX's undertaking- Safeway requested, and PDX agreed to to 
permit its software to print, a five-section monograph, which 
stated it was not complete. Exercising its professional duty to 
7 
its patients, Safeway alone decided whether to give patients the 
monograph to supplement oral counseling from the pharmacist 
and FDA-required documents. C.T. 39. PDX knew Safeway's 
patients would be under a doctor's care and the pharmacy was 
required to provide them individualized counseling and 
applicable FDA-mandated Medication Guides. As a matter of 
law, therefore, the drug information distributed using PDX's 
software was not necessary to protect patients. In finding a 
duty on these facts, the Court of Appeal created a direct conflict 
with a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 
Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 187 Cal.App.4th 709 (20 10) 
("Rivera"), which this Court should resolve. Section V.A, 
infra. 
This Court also should grant review to make clear that 
PDX was entitled to rely on the warnings that others, with a 
direct connection to Plaintiff, legally were obligated to give her. 
In Webb v. Special Electric Co., Case No. S209927 ("Webb"), 
this Court will decide whether a broker can be held liable for 
8 
failing to warn about a dangerous product where the purchaser 
- a sophisticated manufacturer- had a direct duty and ability to 
warn consumers. This case presents a similar issue. The law 
required Plaintiff's physician and pharmacy to warn Plaintiff 
about alleged risks. C.T. 38-41; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201,208. As a 
software vendor, PDX was entitled to rely on these 
professionals to fulfill their legal duty to Plaintiff; it had no 
obligation to warn Plaintiff or to ensure that Safeway fulfilled 
its obligation to inform her. Section V.B, infra. 
Review also is necessary to make clear that Plaintiffs 
may not state a products liability claim- and potentially subject 
PDX to no-fault liability- for true information generated as 
intended by PDX's software. For the first time, the Court of 
Appeal's decision opens the door to an array of lawsuits 
claiming that truthful information or speech produced through 
computer software has harmed the plaintiff in some way, 
exposing software vendors to liability for distributing 
9 
information. Its potential for mischief cannot be overstated. 
Section VI, infra. 
Finally, the Court should grant review to correct the 
Court of Appeal's misapplication of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 ("Section 
230"). Like the broad constitutional protection the law has long 
provided information distributors, Section 230 provides 
immunity to online service providers from state-law claims 
based on third party content. It is undisputed here that WKH, 
not PDX, authored the monograph Plaintiffs challenge, and 
PDX merely provided Safeway with access to the specific 
portions ofWKH's content requested by Safeway. The Court 
of Appeal's decision will expose online providers to liability 
merely for providing users access to information they 
specifically request- which Section 230 was designed to 
prevent. Section VII, infra. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Using an Automated Process, PDX Distributes 
Electronic Summaries of Drug Information 
Authored By Third Parties, which Pharmacies 
Voluntarily Provide to Patients. 
PDX provides pharmacy practice management software 
used to electronically distribute drug information to 
pharmacies, who may provide this information to customers. 
C.T. 38. The software delivers licensed information to 
integrated healthcare delivery networks and more than 9,500 
pharmacies. Id. The software allows the printing of 
monographs for tens of thousands of drugs that summarize 
FDA information in easy-to-read language. Id. PDX does not 
author or update the monographs- which WKH exclusively 
authors and updates. PDX merely provides software that 
enables pharmacies to make the monographs available to 
patients when they receive their medications. I d. The 
pharmacist has sole discretion whether to provide a monograph 
to a customer. Id. 
II 
For certain medications, including the drug Mrs. Hardin 
was prescribed, federal law requires pharmacies to give patients 
FDA-approved and regulated Medication Guides. 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 201, 208. Unlike FDA-approved drug product labeling or 
"Package Inserts," which are written for healthcare 
professionals, Medication Guides are intended to give patients 
information about how to use a drug safely, including how to 
recognize potential side effects that may require medical 
attention. I d. As the monographs generated by Safeway using 
PDX software make clear, monographs are not intended to 
duplicate, replace, or add to the Medication Guides, Package 
Inserts, or particularized medical advice from a patient's doctor 
or pharmacist. C.T. 38-41, 131, 147. 
The Court of Appeal rested its ruling on the premise that 
the monographs are "part of a self-regulating action plan 
required under public law." Op. 2 (citing Pub.L. No. 104-180 
(Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593 (the "Action Plan")). This is 
incorrect. Congress rejected a law that would have required 
12 
manufacturers to produce consumer medication information 
called "MedGuides." C.T. 776. Public Law 104-180 instead 
called for a "plan to be implemented on a voluntary basis and 
without a regulatory mandate." Id. (emphasis added). Other 
record evidence reinforces this conclusion. See,~, C.T. 741 
(Action Plan provides "recommendations"); C.T. 746 
(discussing "Private Sector Voluntary Action Plan"); C.T. 771 
(Action Plan designed to "voluntarily adopt a long-range 
strategy" for consumer medication information). See also C.T. 
789, 791, 797-798. Nothing in the Action Plan remotely 
suggests the monographs are legally required to be distributed, 
or purports to require any particular language or information in 
the monographs that pharmacies may voluntarily give patients. 
C.T. 661, 771. 
B. Mrs. Hardin Suffered Side Effects. 
In March of2010, Mrs. Hardin's physician allegedly 
prescribed her Lamictal for depression. C.T. 4-6. At the time, 
Mrs. Hardin was also taking another medication. C.T. 4. She 
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claims that when she filled her prescription for Lamotrigine (the 
generic form ofLamictal), she only received a monograph 
written by WKH, which was electronically distributed to her 
Safeway pharmacy using PDX's software. Id. 
WKH provides PDX with electronic files containing 
content for monographs through PDX's affiliated company, 
NHIN. C.T. 38-39. WKH writes, formats, develops and 
updates the drug product information that PDX accesses 
through its license with WKH. Id. PDX's software then 
electronically transfers the monographs to the PDX Host, a 
central computer server operated at Safeway's headquarters. Id. 
Safeway regularly received electronic updates from the PDX 
Host server through an online private network computer 
connection. Id. Specific drug information is linked to the 
medication, using WKH methods, which the pharmacy staff can 
select from and print. Id. In 2006, nearly five years before 
Mrs. Hardin filled her prescription, PDX revised its software at 
14 
Safeway's request so that Safeway could print only a five-
section version of monographs. C.T. 661,762-765, 720. 
It is undisputed that as a software provider, PDX had no 
interaction or contract with Mrs. Hardin or any other customer, 
no access to patients' drug history information, and no ability to 
control whether any customer received the Medication Guide, 
let alone the monograph that PDX's software enabled Safeway 
to give its patients. The monograph that Safeway chose to give 
Mrs. Hardin made clear that she should not rely only on it to 
provide comprehensive information, noting that it is 
"[i]mportant to read the Medication Guide before use[.]" C.T. 
41, 130-131, 132-133, 147-148 (emphasis added). It also 
specifically cautioned patients to "CHECK WITH YOUR 
DOCTOR IMMEDIATELY ... [i]fyou experience ... red, 
swollen, peeling or blistered skin." C.T. 147 (emphasis in 
original); see Section V .A.1, infra. 
It is undisputed that Safeway was legally required to give 
Mrs. Hardin the Medication Guide that contained the FDA-
15 
required warnings; Plaintiffs allege that Safeway failed to 
satisfY that legal obligation. C.T. 4-5; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201,208. 
It also is undisputed that Mrs. Hardin's physician was legally 
obligated to warn her of risks; Plaintiffs allege that he also 
failed to satisfY that legal obligation. C.T. 4, 6, 38-41; 21 
C.F.R. §§ 201, 208. In addition, information about this 
particular medication and its associated health risks was 
available online on the FDA's public website. C.T. 40 n.1. 
Mrs. Hardin alleges that she suffered blindness and 
permanent scarring after taking Lam ictal. She and her husband 
sued her physician, GlaxoSmithKline, Taro Pharmaceuticals, 
Safeway, Inc., WKH and PDX, for negligence and products 
liability. On July 3, 2012, the trial court dismissed WKH, 
relying upon Rivera to conclude that "Plaintiffs [could not] 
establish as a matter of law that WKH owed any duty to them." 
C.T. 154, 259. The court dismissed GlaxoSmithKline from this 
action in October 2012. Docket, 10/18/12. Although the trial 
court refused to dismiss Safeway, Inc. and Mrs. Hardin's 
16 
medical providers, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the 
claims barred by California's one-year statute oflimitations for 
health care providers. Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2014 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4364, at * 19 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
6119/14). Thus, Taro and PDX are the only remaining 
defendants. 
IV. 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S 
DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY BURDENS 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
A. A Business Involved in Distributing Consumer 
Product Information Cannot Be Held Liable for 
Distributing True Information. 
The Court of Appeal paid little heed to PDX's First 
Amendment argument, asserting without analysis that PDX did 
not establish "that WKH's monographs are 'truthful 
summaries' of official FDA proceedings." Op. 13. Even if this 
were true - although, as discussed above, it is not (Section 
III.B, supra)- it would tum the First Amendment on its head. 
PDX did not bear the burden of proving that WKH's 
monographs were true; Plaintiffs bore the burden of 
17 
establishing they were false. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 
U.S. 767. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden- or even assert 
that the information produced through PDX's software was 
false; the Court of Appeal plainly erred in summarily 
dismissing the significant First Amendment interests at issue. 
First, the U.S. Supreme Court never has upheld a claim 
based on truthful statements on a matter of public concern, 
particularly where those statements are based on public records 
- here, drug information provided by the FDA. In Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975), the 
court reversed a judgment against a broadcaster for publishing a 
rape victim's name in contravention of Georgia law, holding 
that, "[a]t the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
will not allow ... liability" for truthfully disseminating 
information "released to the public in official court records." 
Id. at 489, 491, 496. As this Court has held, Cox makes clear 
that "'States may not impose sanctions" on the dissemination of 
"truthful information contained in official court records open to 
18 
public inspection."' Gates v. Discovery Commn's, Inc., 34 
Cal.4th 679, 693, 696 (2004) (emphasis added) (striking 
invasion of privacy claim for publishing facts from court 
records). This rule applies not only to court records but "to 
public records in general[.]" Id. at 673 (citation omitted; 
emphasis added). 
But even ifPDX bore the burden of establishing truth-
although it did not- it met its burden. PDX' s software permits 
the electronic distribution of truthful summaries of FDA drug 
information, written and updated by WKH. Like the Package 
Insert and Medication Guide created for this medication, the 
monograph warns that Lamotrigine may trigger an allergic rash: 
"POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS: [ ... ] Symptoms of an allergic 
reaction include rash .... " C. T. 4 I, 131, 14 7. It also repeatedly 
advises patients to consult with their doctor and pharmacist to 
obtain advice regarding risks of the drug. I d. Most 
importantly, it discloses that it is only a summary- namely that 
its "information is generalized and is not intended as specific 
19 
medical advice"- advising patients to read "carefully" the 
FDA-approved Medication Guide. Id. 
Second, courts across the country uniformly reject 
liability for non-reputational injuries purportedly stemming 
from negligent publication. Although plaintiffs do not often 
attempt to assert claims against entities that merely facilitate the 
distribution of speech such as PDX- demonstrating the 
unprecedented nature of the liability found here- the law is 
clear that such claims require more than mere negligence. See, 
~.Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-153 (1959) (book 
store not responsible for content of books it sells absent 
showing of scienter); Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal.App.3d 
842, 852-854 (1984) (same); Rest.2d Torts,§ 581(1), corns. d, e 
("one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter 
published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, 
he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character"). 
Courts also consistently reject claims against publishers, 
although they have a more direct connection to challenged 
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speech. In Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036-1037, the court rejected a 
negligence claim against the publisher of a book about 
mushrooms because "the gentle tug of the First Amendment 
and the values embodied therein would remind us of the social 
costs" if courts imposed such a duty on publication. I d. 
Similarly, in Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125-126 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1989), aff' d, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991 ), the court refused to 
impose negligence liability where plaintiff allegedly died from 
following a diet in a book defendant published. And in Brandt 
v. Weather Channel, 42 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1345-1346 (S.D. Fla. 
1999), the district court refused to impose a duty of care on a 
publisher because it would chill "well established first 
amendment rights." Id. 1 
1 See also,~, Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F.Supp. 282, 
283-284 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (no negligence liability for 
publishing book that allegedly led to explosion, in part 
because of the "tremendous burden such a duty would place 
upon defendant publishers, the weighty societal interest in 
free access to ideas, and potentially unlimited liability"). 
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This deference to the First Amendment applies even 
when defendant is the speaker. For example, in First Equity 
Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179-180 (2d 
Cir. 1989), the court rejected claims based on inaccurate 
financial information, emphasizing that because the publication 
was widely disseminated, "[t]he class of potential plaintiffs is 
multitudinous" and "the user should bear the risk of failing to 
verifY the accuracy of a summary in the absence of proof of a 
knowing misstatement." Id. at 180. And in Yanase v. 
Automobile Club of So. California, 212 Cal.App.3d 468, 474-
476 (1989), the court refused to hold liable the publisher of a 
tour guide after plaintiffs' decedent was killed in the parking lot 
of a motel it listed. 2 
2 See also, Q,&_, Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 130 
Misc.2d 25, 30-31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (trade association not 
liable for injuries resulting from industry standards it 
promulgated); Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 
F.Supp. 990,993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting motion to 
dismiss; "Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is 
guaranteed by the First Amendment."). 
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These cases should have controlled here. The 
monograph Safeway obtained using PDX's software and gave 
Plaintiff does not warrant or guarantee that it is complete; to the 
contrary, it affirmatively states the information is "generalized" 
and not intended as specific medical advice. C.T. 147. The 
monograph also specifically warns patients that serious allergic 
reactions are possible, directing them to "seek immediate 
medical attention." C.T. 41, 131, 147 (emphasis added). 
PDX's only role is providing software as the conduit between 
WKH and pharmacies. C.T. 39. Given the voluntary nature of 
the non-FDA regulated drug information distributed through 
PDX's software, the First Amendment prohibits holding PDX 
liable for alleged negligence in allowing Safeway to give 
patients a five-section (rather than an eight-section) monograph. 
The Court of Appeal's decision could be applied to any 
publisher or distributor of truthful consumer products 
information. It must be reversed. 
23 
B. Even if the First Amendment Permits Imposing 
a Duty to Warn on PDX, It Prohibits Liability 
for Anything Except Knowing Falsity. 
Although it is undisputed that Mrs. Hardin was under the 
care of health care professionals, and that PDX had no 
interaction with her- or any patients -the Court of Appeal 
embraced the negligence standard Plaintiffs advocated. The 
First Amendment demands much more than mere negligence. 
In Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St.3d 286, 291 (1986), 
for example, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a claim against a 
newspaper for losses allegedly sustained due to an inaccurate 
investor report because "merely inaccurate reporting" will not 
support liability. I d. at 288 (citation omitted). Quoting a 
leading treatise, the court held that: 
In the absence of a contract, fiduciary relationship, or 
intentional design to cause injury, a newspaper publisher 
is not liable to a member of the public ... unless he 
wilfully originates or circulates it knowing it to be false, 
and it is calculated to and does, as the proximate cause, 
result in injury to another person. 
Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added). It held that "[r]ecovery 
may be had at best only for knowing or reckless falsehood," but 
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even if plaintiff established such recklessness, it would not 
matter because defendant owed plaintiff no duty of care. I d. at 
289-290. "[T]he competing public policy and constitutional 
concerns tilt decidedly in favor of the press when mere 
negligence is alleged." Id. at 291. 
The Court of Appeal's decision ignores these profound 
First Amendment interests. Plainly, if Plaintiffs physician and 
pharmacist had fulfilled their legal obligations, Plaintiff would 
have no claim against PDX. The decision imposes the burdens 
of manufacturers and distributors on software vendors like PDX 
-permitting liability because PDX allegedly did not adequately 
warn Plaintiff about the risks ofLamotrigine. Yet, PDX played 
no role in prescribing or delivering this medication, and had no 
way to warn Mrs. Hardin, or any of the tens of thousands of 
Safeway's pharmacy patients. And because liability against 
Plaintiffs physician and pharmacist has been rejected, PDX 
runs the risk of standing alone when the jury decides how much 
to award for Plaintiffs injuries. No software vendor should be 
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exposed to this kind of risk for its role in distributing First 
Amendment-protected speech. 
v. 
SOFTWARE VENDORS WHO ENABLE 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRUE CONSUMER 
PRODUCT INFORMATION HAVE NO 
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO WARN ABOUT THE 
ALLEGED DANGERS OF PRODUCTS 
The Court of Appeal cited and purported to distinguish 
Rivera, 187 Cal.App.4th 709. Op. 8-9. But review of both 
decisions demonstrates that they directly conflict on a key issue 
this Court should resolve - whether a vendor whose software 
enables the distribution of truthful consumer product 
information owes a duty under tort law to consumers who 
might receive that information. 
In Rivera, the Fourth District rejected a pharmacy 
patient's claim against First DataBank, which prepared and 
published a monograph given when plaintiff filled his 
prescription. Id. at 713-714. It concluded that the pharmacy's 
failure to provide a medication guide or package insert "does 
not impose any duty on [First DataBank] to change the style, 
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format, or contents of its monograph." Id. at 720. As the trial 
court in this case held in previously granting a Special Motion 
to Strike by WKH (which prepared and published the 
monograph): 
[T)he Rivera Court addressed the issue of duty generally. 
It held that defendant was neither the manufacturer, nor 
the supplier, and that plaintiffs did not show that 
defendant was obligated to provide any information to 
them at all. (I d., at 719.) It further noted that 
defendant's having disclaimed any obligation to provide 
information in the monograph, the information was 
merely supplemental and this further supported a finding 
of no duty. (Ibid.) It did not hold that having undertaken 
the task of providing information concerning potentially 
life-threatening risks, it was obligated to do so in a non-
negligent manner. 
Hardin v. Palo Alto Medical Foundation, Inc., 2012 WL 
8261196, *3 (Cal. Super. 7/3/2012) (emphasis added). Thus, in 
rejecting the claim against WKH, the trial court concluded that 
"under the doctrine of stare decisis Plaintiffs cannot establish as 
a matter of law that WKH owed any duty to them and this court 
is obligated to find that Plaintiffs have no probability of 
prevailing on their claims." I d. at *4 (citation omitted). 
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The Court of Appeal ignored the broad holding from 
Rivera in purporting to distinguish the cases. Op. 8-10. But 
they cannot be distinguished. PDX was entitled to rely on 
Safeway's legal obligation to provide counseling and FDA-
required medication guides to patients. 21 C.F.R. § 208.24(e); 
16 C.C.R. § 1707.2. 
A. The Gratuitous Undertaking Theory Cannot Be 
Applied to Software Vendors. 
In Artiglio, this Court carefully constrained the "good 
Samaritan" liability articulated in Section 324A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, making clear that defendants 
can be held liable only if plaintiffs establish all five elements of 
the tort, and that "the duty of a good Samaritan is limited." 18 
Cal.4th at 614, 615.3 The Court rejected a claim against a 
company based on research performed years earlier, concluding 
3 Those elements include, as relevant here, that (I) the 
actor (here, PDX) "undertook, gratuitously or for 
consideration to render services to another" (here, Safeway); 
and, (2) "the services rendered were of a kind the actor should 
have recognized as necessary for the protection of third 
persons" (Plaintiffs). 
28 
it was not "'an undertaking of such breadth and magnitude as to 
create a duty on the part of Dow Chemical to ensure the safety 
of all of Dow Coming's silicone products."' I d. at 617 (citation 
omitted). The Court concluded that the harm plaintiff alleged 
was too "attenuated and remote" to support liability. Id. at 618. 
The Court of Appeal purported to apply Artiglio, but paid 
little heed to the strict requirements to establish liability-
expanding the application of this limited theory far beyond this 
Court's strict constraints. Op. 10-11. Two elements in 
particular are necessary to ensure that those who merely 
facilitate the delivery of truthful information, such as PDX, are 
not exposed to potentially unlimited liability. 
1. PDX Did Not Undertake to Provide a 
Comprehensive Medication Warning. 
The Court of Appeal overlooked the facts ofthis case in 
defining PDX's undertaking. Op. 10-11. As this Court made 
clear in Artiglio: 
The foundational requirement of the good Samaritan rule 
is that in order for liability to be imposed upon the actor, 
he must specifically have undertaken to perform the task 
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he is charged with having performed negligently, for 
without the actual assumption of the undertaking there 
can be no correlative duty to perform that undertaking 
carefully. 
18 Cal. 4th at 614-615 (citation omitted). 
The decision in Dekens v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 107 
Cal.App.4th 1177 (2003), is instructive. There, plaintiffs sued 
for asbestos exposure their decedent sustained from repairing 
small appliances. Id. at 1179-1180. They alleged that "by 
testing small appliances and certifYing them as safe, [defendant] 
had undertaken to guarantee [the decedent's] safety from illness 
resulting from his exposure to asbestos while repairing those 
small appliances." Id. at 1179. The Court affirmed summary 
judgment for defendant because defendant "never undertook to 
test small appliances for medical safety or to certifY the 
appliances would not cause cancer." Id. at 1180. It made clear 
that the scope of the undertaking necessarily is defined by the 
specific actions taken or promises made. I d. at 1184-1185. 
Numerous courts have rejected attempts to hold 
monograph publishers or distributors liable for harm allegedly 
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resulting from the medications discussed, concluding they owe 
no duty to warn patients of all potential harms. In Cheatham v. 
TEVA Pharm. USA, 726 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1024 (E.D. Ark., 
5/20/1 0), for example, the court rejected a patient's claim 
against WKH, concluding it owed no duty to warn or instruct 
plaintiff regarding possible side effects, for many of the reasons 
enunciated in Rivera. Id. In AB v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, 2013 Phila.Ct.Com.Pl. LEXIS 84, at *19-32 
(2013), the court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to ascribe a duty to 
defendants that voluntarily undertook to develop medical 
literature. The court emphasized that the record lacked 
evidence to suggest either defendant "assumed the 
[manufacturers'] affirmative duty to render services, which it 
knew were necessary for Plaintiffs' protection .... " Id. at *32-
33. See also Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehabilitation 
Center, Inc., 952 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (dentist owed 
no duty of care to plaintiffs who relied on dentist's public 
statements in obtaining treatment). 
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The Court of Appeal addressed none of these cases. 
Instead, it invoked a handful of distinguishable and 
unpersuasive cases. Op. 10. In FNS Mortgage Srvc. Corp. v. 
Pacific General Group, Inc., 24 Cai.App.4th 1564 (1994), 
defendant positioned itself as the sole entity that would inspect 
plumbing products for conformity with standards it alone 
established, which it alone enforced by de listing or withdrawing 
its certification. Id. at 1567. Its purpose was "to assist state 
and local governmental entities in the development and 
enforcement of their plumbing codes." Id. Under those unique 
facts, the court found that defendant undertook to perform 
services it should have recognized as necessary to protect third 
persons. Id. at 1572. Nothing like that exists here. PDX's 
undertaking was merely to provide software enabling Safeway, 
at its option and in the exercise of its professional discretion, to 
print a monograph with the WKH content Safeway requested, 
which was expressly supplemental to the separate Medication 
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Guide Safeway legally was obligated to give patients. C.T. 38-
41; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 208. 
Similarly, in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.App.2d 
at 684, defendant affirmatively guaranteed that it had 
investigated the product advertised and confirmed it was 
"good," and "guarantee[ d] replacement or refund" of defective 
products. Id. at 682. The court held that a duty arose because 
defendant "voluntarily involved itself into the marketing 
process, having in effect loaned its reputation to promote and 
induce the sale of a given product." I d. at 684. Thus, 
defendant's duty turned on its express invitation to consumers 
to rely on its promise and purchase the product. PDX here 
made no such promise- to the contrary, the monograph that 
Safeway gave Plaintiff made clear it was a summary and was 
not complete. C.T. 9; see also C.T. 131, 147.4 
4 See also Op. 10, citing Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer 
Health, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-325-JAR, 2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 
106191 *13, *23-24 (E.D. Mo. 2013), which relied 
exclusively on Missouri and Kentucky law, to reject a motion 
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Relying on these cases and offering scant analysis, the 
Court of Appeal declared that "PDX assumed a duty of care by 
undertaking to render services to Safeway .... " Op. 10-11. It 
ignored the scope of the duty that PDX undertook, which was 
defined by its agreement with Safeway and the monograph's 
express statement that it did not provide complete information. 
C.T. 39, 41, 130-133, 147-148. There is no evidence that PDX 
assumed a duty to print out information that would give patients 
every warning they might expect or want. C.T. 38-41. 
The Court of Appeal clearly erred in rejecting this 
fundamental point based only on its perplexing assertion, with 
to dismiss filed by monograph publisher WKH because no 
other case in those jurisdictions had rejected duty on similar 
facts; Slater v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 771 F.Supp.2d 524, 
527-528 (E.D. Pa. 2011 ), which rejected a fraudulent joinder 
challenge, without purporting to undertake the complex duty 
analysis, finding that the claims were not a "clear legal 
impossibility" because no Pennsylvania court had decided the 
issue; and, Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316,325 
(2002), which held that a pharmacy undertook a duty to warn 
where "the patient could reasonably interpret the warning 
form as a complete and comprehensive list of all known side 
effects." 
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no further analysis, that "it is the nature ofPDX's undertaking, 
not the care with which it was carried out, that determines 
whether it assumed a duty under section 324A in the first 
place." Op. 11. As the undisputed evidence made clear, the 
nature ofPDX's undertaking was to provide a monograph to 
supplement the pharmacist's advice and the Medication Guide. 
The Court apparently was influenced by (1) the Action 
Plan (which it incorrectly believed rendered the monographs 
legally required),5 (2) PDX's encouragement to Safeway to 
provide patients with eight-section monographs, and (3) the 
2006 indemnity agreement between PDX and Safeway. Op. 2-
3, 10-11. But PDX only undertook to provide software that 
enabled Safeway to print a WKH monograph in the form that 
5 The Action Plan guidelines are voluntary, and impose 
no obligation to distribute monographs. C.T. 661, 771. 
Indeed, given the strict First Amendment limitations 
discussed above (Section IV.A, supra), mandatory regulations 
likely would not have survived First Amendment scrutiny . 
.!ig_,, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 
(1974) (statute compelling newspaper to print editorial reply 
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper"). 
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Safeway, in its professional discretion, chose. These facts 
should have led the Court of Appeal to reject liability because if 
PDX assumed any obligation- which PDX denies - its 
agreement with Safeway and the express language of the 
monograph limited the scope of that undertaking. This Court 
should grant review and make clear that liability against those 
who help distribute speech, such as software vendors like PDX, 
is limited by the scope of their undertaking. 
2. Because Safeway Was Required to 
Provide FDA-Mandated Warnings, 
Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries Were Not 
Foreseeable. 
The Court of Appeal made no attempt to analyze the 
most important element of the duty analysis- foreseeability-
beyond quoting the second element of the good Samaritan test. 
Op. 11. The record does not support the Court's foreseeability 
finding. 
As California courts have made clear, '"[w]ithout 
evidence that a defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known there was any danger or potential danger associated with 
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that defendant's act or failure to act, any imposition ofliability 
would in essence be the imposition ofliability without fault."' 
Ludwig v. City of San Diego, 65 Cai.App.4th 1105, 1111 
(1998) (citation omitted). That court emphasized that "the law 
of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others 
which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable." 
Id. (citations omitted). The court's focus is not on whether a 
particular plaintiff's injury was "reasonably foreseeable in light 
of a particular defendant's conduct," but "whether the category 
of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the 
kind ofhann experienced that liability may appropriately be 
imposed on the negligent party." I d. at 1114 (citation omitted). 
In Ludwig. the court found no duty- despite evidence that 
defendant acted spitefully in allegedly causing plaintiff's injury 
- because defendant could not reasonably have known his 
actions created a risk for plaintiff. Id. at 1113-1114. 
The standard adopted in this case, by contrast, sanctions 
unprecedented liability for independent publishers and software 
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providers who help others voluntarily distribute truthful 
consumer product information, based on nothing more than 
plaintiff's claim that the information did not contain every 
warning possible. Given the undisputed fact that monographs 
are intended to supplement- not supplant - the medical advice 
patients receive from their health care professionals and the 
FDA-required Medication Guide, the harm Plaintiff allegedly 
sustained was not foreseeable, and the voluntary monograph 
was not necessary to protect Plaintiff. The Court of Appeal's 
published decision drastically and unnecessarily expands the 
circumstances in which a "good Samaritan" might be held 
liable, and will chill speech. It must be reversed. 
B. A Distributor of Consumer Product 
Information Is Entitled to Rely on its Business 
Partner, Which Has a Direct Relationship with 
the Consumer, to Provide all Warnings that 
Business Partner Is Legally Required to 
Provide. 
In Webb, No. S209927, this Court will decide whether an 
asbestos broker can be held liable for failing to provide a 
warning where the purchaser - a sophisticated manufacturer -
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had a direct duty and ability to warn consumers about the 
product's danger. The Court will decide whether the broker 
was entitled to assume the manufacturer would perform its legal 
duty and provide the required warnings to the consumer. 
The issue presented in this case is one step removed, 
because as a software vendor with no interaction with patients, 
PDX is outside of the chain of distribution. PDX has no 
knowledge of patients' medical or medication histories, and 
therefore can have no legal duty to provide warnings to 
patients. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal's decision exposes 
PDX to liability on what is essentially a failure-to-warn theory, 
because the truthful drug information that PDX enabled 
Safeway to provide to its patients- at Safeway's sole discretion 
-allegedly injured Plaintiff. Op. 11.6 The same principles that 
6 The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion despite 
the fact that California follows the "learned intermediary 
doctrine," which provides that a manufacturer only has a duty 
to warn the doctor of the dangers of a prescription drug 
because the doctor is in the best position to assess the pros 
and cons of prescribing a drug in the context of the patient's 
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Petitioner invokes in Webb fully apply here. "The general rule 
is that every person has a right to presume that every other 
person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in the 
absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not 
negligence to assume that he is not exposed to danger which 
comes to him only from violation of law or duty by such other 
person." Petition for Review, filed 4/22/13, at *26 (citations 
omitted). 
Public policy should encourage admonitions like those 
given by PDXto Safeway (C.T. 660, 748-751)-to enhance the 
summary drug information that Safeway might provide to its 
patients- so that companies are not punished for adopting and 
medical history, and provide side effect warnings. Brown v. 
Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1061-1062, 1062 n.9 (1988); 
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 40 Cal.3d 672, 679 (1985); 
see also Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 6 
Cal.4th 124, 132 (1993). Although federal and state 
regulations may impose particular duties on pharmacists, any 
common law duty to provide individualized warnings 
generally begins and ends with a patient's doctor. It makes no 
sense to impose a common law duty on the pharmacy's 
vendor merely because its software enables the distribution of 
optional drug information summaries. 
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trying to enforce policies that are not legally required, but 
which the companies believe may benefit the public. When 
Safeway insisted that PDX modifY its software to provide the 
five-section WKH monographs, PDX knew and relied on the 
fact that Safeway pharmacists are obligated to provide 
personalized counseling, and if the FDA believes a warning 
regarding a particular medication is necessary, they are legally 
obligated to provide that warning, in the form of the FDA-
mandated Medication Guide. This Court should grant review 
and make clear that those who help distribute truthful consumer 
product information such as PDX cannot be held liable for a 
third party's alleged failure to provide legally-required 
warnings. 
VI. 
THE COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFFS ABANDONED 
PDX petitioned the Court of Appeal for rehearing, in part 
because the Court failed to dismiss the products liability claim 
that Plaintiffs abandoned. Pet. Reh., filed 7/7/14, at 4-5. The 
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Court denied PDX's Petition, asserting that Plaintiffs claim 
"that PDX's software program, not the information it produces, 
is the defective product." Order, 7/21114 (emphasis in 
original). But Plaintiffs did not come close to meeting their 
burden under the SLAPP statute of establishing that PDX' s 
software was defective; indeed, they did not even try. PDX's 
software functioned as intended, enabling Safeway to distribute 
the precise information Safeway chose. C.T. 720. The alleged 
"defect" was that the software did not require Safeway to print 
an eight-section monograph- that the information it relayed 
purportedly was incomplete. C.T. 655. The Court's opinion 
misstates Plaintiffs' claim and expands products liability law in 
California, exposing software providers to no-fault products 
liability claims for facilitating the distribution of true 
information. 
As PDX argued below, Plaintiffs' products liability claim 
is defective because Plaintiffs failed to show that PDX is the 
seller of a product as required by the Restatement (Third) of 
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Torts (1988). O.B. 44-46, citing id. §§ 1-2.7 A "product" is a 
"physical article which results from a manufacturing process 
and is ultimately delivered to a consumer." Pierson v. Sharp 
Memorial Hosp., 216 Cal.App.3d 340,345 (1989). 
"Information" is not a "product" under products liability law. 
Torres v. City of Madera, No. CIVFF02-6385, 2005 WL 
1683736, * 13-14 (E.D. Cal. 7111/05) (training materials for 
Taser weapons not "products"; "[i]deas and expressions in 
books are generally not considered products for purposes of 
strict liability"). 
In Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035-36, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the Court of Appeal's reasoning here, holding that 
plaintiffs who relied on allegedly erroneous information in an 
encyclopedia had no strict products liability claim because 
expressions are not tangible, physical items. "The purposes 
served by products liability law also are focused on the tangible 
7 See Jiminez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 473, 479 
(2002) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts; services are not 
products). 
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world and do not take into consideration the unique 
characteristics of ideas and expression." I d. at I 034. The court 
discussed the dangers from permitting strict products liability 
for ideas or expression: 
The threat ofliability without fault (financial 
responsibility for our words and ideas in the 
absence of fault or a special undertaking or 
responsibility) could seriously inhibit those who 
wish to share thoughts and theories .... [W]ith the 
specter of strict liability, "[ w ]ould any author wish 
to be exposed ... for writing on a topic which might 
result in physical injury? ~ How to cut trees; 
How to keep bees?" ... One might add: "Would 
anyone undertake to guide by ideas expressed in 
words either a discrete group, a nation, or 
humanity in general?" 
I d. at 1035 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1036 n.6 
(discussing cases). 
Plaintiffs do not claim they were harmed by PDX's 
software program itself. They claim they were harmed by the 
allegedly "deficient, incomplete monograph"- the information 
the software program produces. C.T. 655. This is exactly what 
courts uniformly reject. The Court of Appeal could not (and 
did not) cite a single case to support its novel opinion that a 
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software program that produced the very information intended 
can be a defective product for purposes of products liability 
law, where the only harm alleged purportedly resulted from 
information the program generated. PDX is aware of none. 
The Court of Appeal's opinion must be reversed. 
VII. 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S PUBLISHED 
DECISION WILL CREATE CONFUSION IN 
APPLICATION OF SECTION 230 
In the brick-and-mortar world, the legal analysis might 
end here. Because PDX distributes information through 
interactive servers, however, it enjoys independent protection 
under Section 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230. The Court of Appeal 
admittedly paid only "brief attention" to this argument. Op. at 
11-12. It ignored the language of the statute, the policies on 
which Congress based Section 230, and cases interpreting the 
law to provide broad immunity for interactive computer 
services that serve as conduits for content authored by third-
parties. 
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Under Section 230, "[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). Thus, to find 
immunity, the statute requires that "( 1) the defendant be a 
provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the 
cause of action treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of 
information; and (3) the information at issue be provided by 
another information content provider." Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 
Cal.App.4th 816, 830 (2002); accord Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs' claims treat PDX 
as the "publisher" of the monographs, nor that PDX is a 
"provider or user of an interactive computer service." C.T. 38-
39. Although Section 230 often arises in the context of 
websites, it broadly applies to all interactive computer services, 
i.e., "any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple 
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users to a computer server." 47 U.S.C. § 230(t)(2). See Zango, 
Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 
2009) (anti-malware software provider). Because POX enables 
access by pharmacies to its servers, POX satisfies this 
definition. C.T. 39. 
The Court of Appeal found that Section 230 does not 
apply because POX became an "information content provider" 
by only allowing five-section monographs to be printed, at 
Safeway's request. But under well-established law, Section 
230 protects online providers for any acts taken in their capacity 
as publishers or speakers, including editing content. It therefore 
squarely protects POX's decision to alter its software code to 
allow Safeway to print shorter versions of thousands of 
monographs. 
Section 230 defines "information content provider" as 
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47 
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U.S.C. § 230(t)(3). Applying this definition, courts have found 
that "lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its 
exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions- such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content- are barred." Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 
(1Oth Cir. 2000) (AOL's editing and deletion ofallegedly 
erroneous stock information did not transform it into content 
provider); Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 57. 
Thus, courts routinely dismiss claims based on an online 
provider's decision to distribute some, but not all, third-party 
content, or to re-organize that content. "The exclusion of 
'publisher' liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising 
the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered 
material and to edit the material published while retaining its 
basic form and message." Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (emphasis 
added); see also Gentrv, 99 Cai.App.4th at 817 (rejecting 
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claims that eBay became content provider by creating forum for 
feedback on sellers and categorizing user responses); Carafano 
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(dating website immune for claims premised on display of fake 
profile although site asked pre-prepared questions and 
organized responses into profiles). Similarly, courts have 
upheld Section 230 immunity for providers of software 
designed to display third-party content in a particular manner, 
such as in categories. See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 
1456316, at *4-6 (D. Ariz. 411 5114); O'Kroley v. Fastcase Inc., 
2014 WL 2197029, *3 (M.D. Tenn. 5/27/14). 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected 
a theory similar to the one adopted by the Court of Appeal here. 
In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), 
plaintiff alleged that Yahoo! was negligent under a gratuitous 
undertaking theory because it promised but failed to delete a 
fake user profile. The court reasoned that a plaintiff"cannot 
escape section 230(c) by labeling as a 'negligent undertaking' 
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an action that is quintessentially that of a publisher." I d. at 
1102-03. Thus, plaintiff's attempt to hold Yahoo! responsible 
for its failure to remove content- "something publishers do"-
failed. Id. 
PDX similarly is not an "information content provider" 
of the thousands of monographs accessible through its software. 
It undisputedly did not author any of the content in the five-
section monographs, which WKH exclusively authored and 
updated. That PDX acted as publisher and allowed Safeway to 
print shorter monographs years before Plaintiff filled her 
prescription is conduct that falls squarely within the heart of 
Section 230 immunity. 8 Under the Court of Appeal's decision, 
online providers now risk exposure to significant liability just 
by excerpting third-party content regardless of whether the 
8 The Court of Appeal cited Anthony v. Yahoo Inc., 421 
F.Supp.2d 1257 (2006). But there, plaintiff alleged that 
defendant had itself created the underlying unlawful content-
fake dating profiles. Here, there is no dispute WKH 
exclusively created and regularly updated the contents of the 
monographs accessed through PDX's software. C.T. 38-39. 
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information is false or legally required. This is not and cannot 
be the law. See Section V.A, supra. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal's published decision creates a 
firestorm of liability for speech that falls squarely within the 
broad protection of the First Amendment. It creates a new 
cause of action, exposing everyone involved in publishing and 
distributing truthful consumer product information to liability if 
a jury believes they were merely negligent in allegedly failing 
to provide every warning a consumer might demand with the 
benefit of hindsight- and potentially even to strict products 
liability. Given the pervasive role of the Internet, there can be 
no question that the Court of Appeal's misconceived Opinion 
will trample First Amendment rights. 
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For all of the reasons discussed above, PDX respectfully 
requests that the Court grant review in this matter and reverse 
the Court of Appeal's decision. 
2014. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July, 
DAVIS WRJGHT TREMAINE LLP 
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52 
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT 
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.204(c), the text of 
this brief, including footnotes and excluding the caption page, 
table of contents, table of authorities, the signature blocks and 
this Certificate, consists of 8,394 words in 14-point Times New 
Roman type as counted by the Microsoft Word word-
processing program used to generate the text. 
Dated this 28th day of July, 2014. 
DWT 24530846v3 0096667-00000 I 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
Thomas R. Burke 
Attorneys for Appellants and 
Defendants PDX, INC. and 
NATIONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. 
53 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT A 
 1 
 
Filed 6/19/14 
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
 
DIVISION THREE 
 
 
KATHLEEN HARDIN et al., 
 Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
PDX, INC., et al., 
 Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
      A137035 
 
      (Alameda County 
      Super. Ct. No. RG11600291) 
 
 
 PDX,  Inc. claims the trial court erred when it denied a motion to strike brought 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and refused to dismiss a negligence and 
product liability action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.  Because the 
plaintiff  demonstrated a probability she may prevail on her claim, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
 Kathleen Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful 
scarring after she began taking Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal.  
According to her complaint, Hardin later learned that Lamotrigine carries a significant 
risk of causing Stevens-Johnson syndrome (SJS) and associated toxic epidermal 
necrolysis that resulted in her injuries, particularly when taken in combination with 
another of her prescribed medications.    
Hardin and her husband1 filed suit for negligence and product liability against 
multiple defendants, including the physician who prescribed her Lamotrigine, 
GlaxoSmithKline, which manufactured it, Safeway, Inc., where she purchased it, and 
                                                          
 1For simplicity, we will refer to plaintiffs jointly as Hardin. 
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Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. (WKH), which produced the drug information pamphlet, or 
monograph, Safeway provided when it filled Hardin’s prescription.  WKH monographs 
offer summaries of information from official FDA physician package inserts and patient 
medication guides written in lay language for consumers and are intended to provide a 
written supplement to the oral counseling patients receive from their pharmacists when 
they have a prescription filled.  (See generally Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187 
Cal.App.4th 709, 713 (Rivera).)  Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication 
guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by 
the FDA.  Rather, the monographs are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan 
required under public law as approved by the Secretary of the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services.  (Pub.L. No. 104-180 (Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593.)    
 The action plan summarizes its goal by stating:  “The purpose of this Action Plan 
is to improve the quality and availability of useful information that is voluntarily 
provided to consumers with their prescription medicines.  The rationale for the Plan is 
that providing consumers with useful information about their prescription medicines can 
reduce the risk of preventable, medication-induced injury and improve health outcomes.”  
The action plan goes on to describe useful information as “that which is sufficiently 
comprehensive and communicated such that consumers can make informed decisions 
about how to receive the most benefit from medicines and protect themselves from harm.  
Both the substance and presentation of the information are important.”  Nevertheless, 
each monograph states that it is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all risks 
and benefits of the medication and cautions consumers against relying solely on the 
monograph for information about the medication.     
  There does not seem to be any material factual dispute about the nature of PDX’s 
activities.  As explained in the declaration of Benjamin Loy, PDX’s vice president of 
industry relations, in support of the motion to strike, PDX is “an independent provider of 
software that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers.”  One component of 
its business  involves disseminating patient drug education monographs authored by third 
parties.  To that end, its software “enables pharmacies to access [WKH’s] database of 
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Monographs.  WKH is an independent publisher of medical information for the general 
public concerning drugs approved for sale by the FDA. . . . [¶] PDX, Inc. does not author 
the Monographs but instead, provides this information under an authorization in the data 
license agreement between NHIN, PDX, Inc.’s affiliated company, and WKH.”  PDX 
and NHIN thus “function as pass through entities to distribute Monographs that are 
prepared by WKH to retailers selling prescription drugs like Safeway” and are printed 
and distributed to the individual customer when a prescription is filled.   
Decisions about the content of these monographs were made by Safeway, not by 
PDX.  According to Mr. Loy, “WKH, as the [data] owner and licensor, writes, formats, 
develops and updates the drug product information that PDX accesses through its license 
with WKH.  Neither PDX nor NHIN modify the drug product information in any manner 
whatsoever.”  Prior to 2005, PDX’s software enabled its licensees to print out either the 
long (eight-section) or short (five-section) version of the monograph for any given drug.  
The short version excluded sections under the headings “Before Using This Medication,” 
“Overdose,” and “Additional Information.”  The “Before Using This Medication” section 
contains warnings about taking the drug that may include warnings about drug 
interactions or complications due to coexisting medical conditions.  In 2005, in response 
to regulatory guidelines, PDX revised its software so that it would no longer print the 
abbreviated monographs.  For reasons not clear from the record, Safeway did not want to 
utilize the full eight-section monographs and asked PDX to revise its software so that 
Safeway could continue to print only the five-section versions.  PDX complied with that 
request after it obtained a release of liability and indemnity agreement from Safeway.   
 The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first 
filled her prescription for Lamictal, and the only patient information she considered in 
deciding whether to take the medication.  The abbreviated warning utilized by Safeway 
and provided to Hardin omitted what is referred to as the “Black Box” warning under the 
heading “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND 
SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF 
THIS MEDICINE. . . .  Contact your doctor immediately if you develop rash symptoms, 
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including red, swollen, blistered or peeling skin.  Treatment with this medication should 
be stopped unless it is clearly determined that the medicine did not cause the rash.  Even 
if the medicine is stopped, a rash caused by this medicine may still become life-
threatening or cause serious side effects (such as permanent scarring).”  Hardin says that 
had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication.      
WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure
2 
section 425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP” statute) on the ground that the products liability and 
negligence claims against it arose from protected speech concerning a public issue or an 
issue of public interest.  The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs 
was protected speech under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) and that Hardin had no 
probability of prevailing on her claims because, following the rationale of Rivera, supra, 
187 Cal.App.4th 709, she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty.  
Accordingly, the court granted WKH’s motion and dismissed the claims against it.   
Hardin amended her complaint to allege causes of action for negligence and 
products liability against PDX, Inc. and National Health Information Network, Inc. 
(NHIN).
3
  PDX also moved under the anti-SLAPP statute to strike Hardin’s claims, 
which it argued were identical to the dismissed claims against WKH and barred for the 
same reasons.  
  This time, the trial court disagreed.  It determined that the activity underlying  
PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give 
customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings about SJS 
instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings.  “Plaintiffs have 
asserted acts by PDX that go beyond mere distribution of the WKH’s monographs.  
Plaintiffs assert that in 2005 PDX revised its software program to prevent its customers, 
including Safeway, ‘from printing the five section abbreviated monograph and allowed 
                                                          
 
2
Unless otherwise noted, further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
3
Jointly referred to as PDX. 
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only the printing of the complete eight section monograph.’  [Citation.]  According to Mr. 
Loy, Senior Vice President of Industry Relations for PDX, Inc. and National Health 
Information Network Inc., [citation], ‘[t]his software revision was made in response to 
both regulatory guidelines for the provision of patient education information and an 
internal recommendation by Jim Boyd, R.Ph., then Sr. Vice President [of] Network 
Services NHIN.’  [Citation.]  Then, in 2006, a Safeway representative contacted PDX 
because it wanted to use the five section monograph, rather than the eight section 
monograph with the warnings at issue here.  [Citation.]  In response, ‘[p]rogramming to 
allow the system to provide the five section monograph was made available by PDX [] to 
Safeway. . . .’  [Citation.]  Given these facts, this is not a case in which a defendant 
merely distributed information from a third party author or publisher.”   
The court concluded that PDX’s reprogramming activities were not acts in 
furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech within the meaning of 
section 425.16 and denied PDX’s motion to strike.  PDX filed a timely appeal from the 
court’s order.  (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) 
DISCUSSION  
I.  The Anti-SLAPP Statute 
 Unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech 
or petitioning activity may be stricken pursuant to a motion filed under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.16.  (See Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 
Cal.App.4th 90, 102.)  This anti-SLAPP statute provides:  “(b)(1) A cause of action 
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution 
in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the 
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim. [¶] . . . [¶]  (e) As used in this section, ‘act in 
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States 
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Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes:  
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or 
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or 
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review 
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized 
by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or 
a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right 
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  
(§ 425.16.)  “The only way a defendant can make a sufficient threshold showing is to 
demonstrate that the conduct by which the plaintiff claims to have been injured falls 
within one of those four categories.”  (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 
1130.)   
 We consider an anti-SLAPP motion in a two-step process.  “First, the court 
decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of 
action is one arising from protected activity.  The moving defendant’s burden is to 
demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in 
furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or 
California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then 
determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the 
claim.  Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these 
determinations considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating 
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”  (Equilon Enterprises v. 
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).)   
 We review the trial court’s determinations as to whether the plaintiff has shown a 
probability of prevailing independently.  (ComputerXpress,  Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 
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Cal.App.4th 993, 999.)  An anti-SLAPP motion does not survive this prong “ ‘if the 
plaintiff presents evidence establishing a prima facie case which, if believed by the trier 
of fact, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Fleishman v. Superior 
Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 350, 356.)  We neither “ ‘ “weigh credibility [nor] 
compare the weight of the evidence.  Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable 
to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has 
defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (Nygard, Inc. v. 
Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1036 (Nygard).)  “In order to satisfy due 
process, the burden placed on the plaintiff must be compatible with the early stage at 
which the motion is brought and heard [citation] and the limited opportunity to conduct 
discovery.”  (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823, disapproved on 
other grounds in Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5.)  Only a minimal showing of 
merit is required.  (Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 318.) 
We affirm if the trial court’s decision is correct for any reason, regardless of the 
correctness of the grounds upon which it reached its conclusion.  (In re Estate of Beard 
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 776.)   
II.  Analysis 
The trial court based its ruling on its conclusion that PDX’s role in the production 
and dissemination of the short-form monograph Hardin received was not “conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right 
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest,” and, thus, 
was beyond the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).  We need not answer this 
interesting question, for, assuming arguendo that Hardin’s claims against PDX arose 
from protected first amendment activity, if credited at trial  her evidence would be 
sufficient to support a favorable judgment.  (See Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 
713–714 [plaintiff’s burden opposing anti-SLAPP motion is to state and substantiate a 
legally sufficient claim]; Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.)    
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A. Rivera v. First Databank, Inc. Is Factually Inapposite 
PDX argues that Hardin’s negligence claim fails under Rivera v. First DataBank, 
Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709.  It maintains Rivera holds that, as a matter of  law, 
PDX has no duty to consumers who receive drug monographs through its software.  We 
are not persuaded that Rivera controls here. 
The plaintiffs’ decedent in Rivera committed suicide shortly after he began taking 
the anti-depressant drug Paxil.  First DataBank, Inc. (First DataBank) published the drug 
monograph Rivera received from his pharmacist.  The plaintiffs alleged the monograph 
omitted the FDA’s black-box suicide warnings for Paxil, and that the warnings it 
included were vague, confusing, and buried in fine print.  (Rivera, supra,187 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 713–714.)  The trial court denied the motion (id. at p. 714), but the court of appeal 
reversed.  After concluding that the lawsuit targeted protected speech (§ 425.17, subd. 
(c)), the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success at trial 
because they failed to establish First DataBank owed them a legal duty. (Rivera, supra, 
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)  First, it noted, the plaintiffs presented no evidence 
supporting their allegation that the monograph omitted the black box warning.  (See 
Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45 ([“plaintiff cannot rely 
on the allegations of the complaint alone, but must present admissible evidence”].)  
Second, the allegedly omitted warning would not have applied to the 50-year old Rivera 
because it warned of suicide risks only among children and adolescents.  (Rivera, supra, 
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)    
This case is different.  Unlike Rivera, here there was evidence that the black-box 
warning had been deleted from the monograph Hardin received with her prescription.  
Hardin attested that “[t]he Wolters Kluwer Health medicine information monograph I 
received, read and relied upon in deciding to take Lamictal/Lamotrigine did not include 
the section which is in capital letters and starts with WARNING: SERIOUS AND 
SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF 
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THIS MEDICINE, that the rashes warned about appear as red, swollen, blistered, peeling 
skin and that the rashes warned about could be life-threatening even if you stop taking the 
medication and that the rashes warned about could cause serious side effects such as 
permanent scarring.”  The evidence Hardin submitted also contains the abbreviated 
monograph described in her declaration alongside the full eight-section monograph 
complete with the omitted warnings.  In further contrast to Rivera, the omitted sections, if 
included, would have applied to all potential consumers of Lamotrigine.  The evidentiary 
shortcomings presented in Rivera are not present here. 
B. Rivera Does Not Address The Negligent Undertaking Doctrine     
Rivera is also of limited precedential value for another reason: it does not address 
Hardin’s theory that, in undertaking to provide patient drug monographs, PDX assumed a 
duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine.  (See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 
Cal.2d 520, 524 fn. 2 [“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the 
light of the facts and the issue then before the court”].)  This common law theory, restated 
in section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter section 324A), “is one 
of liability to third persons for physical harm caused when, under certain listed 
circumstances, one negligently performs an undertaking to another.  In its entirety, 
section 324A reads: ‘One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [perform] his undertaking, if [¶] (a) his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or [¶] (b) he has 
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or [¶] (c) the harm is 
suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.’ [¶] . . .  
Indeed, ‘[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act . . . may thereby become 
subject to a duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.  [Citation]  As ‘Dean Prosser 
says . . . , “[i]f the defendant enters upon an affirmative course of conduct affecting the 
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interests of another, he is regarded as assuming a duty to act, and will thereafter be liable 
for negligent acts or omissions[.]” ’ ”  (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 
612–613 (Artiglio).) 
FNS Mortgage Service Corp. v. Pacific General Group, Inc. (1994) 24 
Cal.App.4th 1564 is illustrative.  The defendant, IAPMO, promulgated a uniform 
plumbing code, certified plumbing products that met its standards, and published a 
directory listing certified products.  The owners and developers of an apartment complex 
sued IAPMO for property damage allegedly caused by defective, IAPMO-certified drain, 
waste and vent pipe.  (Id. at pp. 1566–1570.)  Citing section 324A, the court of appeal 
held that IAPMO assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out its 
enterprise when it voluntarily undertook to identify pipe manufacturers that adhered to its 
standards for the consuming public.  (Id. at p. 1572; see also Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. 
(1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 680, 684 [publisher that conducted product endorsement program 
assumed a duty of ordinary care to consumers who relied on its endorsement].)  Other 
jurisdictions, although apparently no California courts, have considered that parties who 
engage in providing medication warnings to consumers may be found to have assumed a 
duty to use due care in carrying out their enterprise. (See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer 
Health, Inc. (E.D.Mo. July 30, 2013 No. 4:11-cv-325-JAR) 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
106191*13 [failure to warn claims targeting WKH monographs withstood motion to 
dismiss under assumption of duty principles];  Slater v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. (E.D. Pa. 
2011) 771 F.Supp.2d 524, 527–528 [negligent undertaking theory of duty withstood 
frivolous joinder challenge]; Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy (Mass. 2002) 764 N.E.2d 814, 
821–823 [where patient could reasonably interpret warning provided by pharmacy as 
complete list of all known side effects, pharmacist’s duty was “commensurate with what 
it appeared to have undertaken”].)  
Here, Hardin presented evidence that PDX knew that enabling Safeway to print 
the abbreviated monograph could place patients at risk, including, notably, the 
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acknowledgement in its 2006 agreement with Safeway that providing the full eight-
section version would better enable patients to “use the medication properly and 
appropriately, receive the maximum benefit, and avoid harm.”  This record sufficiently 
makes out a claim that PDX assumed a duty of care by undertaking to render services to 
Safeway “of a kind [it] should have recognized as necessary for the protection of third 
persons. . . .”  (Artiglio, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 604).   
Citing Rivera, PDX also argues it had no duty to Hardin because the abbreviated 
Lamotrigine monograph included a warning that it did not cover all possible adverse 
effects and advised patients to read the medication guide and consult their physicians 
before taking the medication.  We disagree with PDX’s view that, as a matter of law, this 
language has any bearing upon the scope of its duty.  The cited provisos and their 
foreseeable effect on consumers are relevant to whether PDX acted with due care when it 
enabled Safeway to omit warnings from WKH monographs, but it is the nature of PDX’s 
undertaking, not the care with which it was carried out, that determines whether it 
assumed a duty under section 324A in the first place. 
PDX’s remaining arguments merit only brief attention.  PDX claims Hardin failed 
to show causation, but her declaration says the WKH monograph was the only 
medication information she received, that she read and relied on it, and that she would 
not have taken Lamotrigine had it included a warning about serious or fatal rashes.  PDX 
also asserts Evidence Code section 11554 bars Hardin from relying upon the indemnity 
clause in PDX’s 2006 agreement with Safeway to prove negligence, but, assuming the 
indemnity language is inadmissible, there is no reason to believe its exclusion would 
prevent Hardin from proving her case.   
PDX’s claim that section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (47 
U.S.C. § 230, hereinafter CDA) immunizes it from liability for providing electronic 
                                                          
 4Under Evidence Code section 1155, “Evidence that a person was, at the time a 
harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from 
liability for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.” 
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access to WKH monographs is also unpersuasive.  “The CDA provides that (1) ‘[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’ and (2) 
‘[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local rule that is inconsistent with this section.’  [Citation.]  Section 230(f)(2) defines 
‘interactive computer service’ as ‘any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
service, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet[.]’  
An ‘information content provider’ is ‘any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.’  [Citation.]  ‘Congress clearly enacted § 230 to 
forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its 
editorial and self-regulatory functions.’ ”  (Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2006) 421 
F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (Anthony).)   
 Hardin’s claim against PDX does not arise from its role as the software or service 
provider that enabled Safeway to access the WKH Lamotrigine monograph.  Hardin sued 
PDX because it intentionally modified its software to allow Safeway to distribute 
abbreviated drug monographs that automatically omitted warnings of serious risks.  As 
the trial court found, “this is not a case in which a defendant merely distributed 
information from a third party author or publisher.”  PDX cites, and we are aware of, no 
case holding the CDA to have immunized a defendant from allegations that it participated 
in creating or altering content.  (See Anthony, supra, 421 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1262–1263.)  
“One need look no further than the face of the statute to see why. The CDA only 
immunizes ‘information provided by another information content provider.’  (47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1).)”  (Id. at p. 1263.) 
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PDX also asserts that the First Amendment and Civil Code section 47, subdivision 
(d)5 immunize it from liability for distributing what it describes as “truthful summaries of 
the FDA’s Package Insert and Medication Guide.”  It has not been established at this 
juncture that WKH’s monographs are “truthful summaries” of official FDA proceedings, 
that they qualify as “public journals” for purposes of the section 47, subdivision (d) 
privilege, or that they “do nothing to dilute” the warnings in FDA-approved mediation 
guides and package inserts and are not otherwise misleading.  PDX’s evidence has not 
defeated that submitted by Hardin as a matter of law (see Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1036), so its anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied.  
DISPOSITION 
The order denying PDX’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. 
 
 
       _________________________ 
       Siggins, J. 
 
 
We concur: 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
McGuiness, P.J. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Pollak, J. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 5Civil Code section 47 privileges a publication or broadcast “made [¶] . . . [¶] 
(d)(1) By a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a 
judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in 
the course thereof . . . .” 
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